Is Paternalism Compatible with Love?

In modern philosophical thought paternalism is often viewed with suspicion. Frequently, it is associated with morally problematic actions such as coercion, condescension, and the denial of individual autonomy. Due to this troubling association, a significant subset of philosophers believe that paternalism is largely incompatible with love.

One of the most recent philosophical attempts to argue for the incompatibility between paternalism and love has been put forth by P. Quinn White. In “Love First” White argues that one of the main features of agape (love) is that it is essentially anti-paternalistic. Although White does not offer a detailed definition of paternalism, he essentially understands it as “overriding the choices or ends of another for the sake of her well-being.” (White, 2025, p. 873) This conception of paternalism qua love is plausible in virtue of its conservatism. To elaborate, according to this view, acting paternalistically requires that we attempt to override someone’s choices or aims via our actions, which can include coercion, deception, or employing the use of ultimatums. Therefore, paternalism necessitates that someone’s choices and aims are at odds with what we consider to be their better interests. Furthermore, that we attempt to force our desired outcomes over theirs.

White believes that love puts anti-paternalistic constraints on how to interact with those we love. To act lovingly, we “will not promote another’s well-being when doing so would override her choices.” (Ibid., p. 867) Similarly, that “inasmuch as one does violate paternalistic constraints, one is unloving.” (Ibid., p. 873) However, White’s view goes even further. He claims, “it seems that one of the most loving things we can do for those we love is support their choices and ability to author their lives as they see fit.” (Ibid.) Therefore, not only is paternalism incompatible with love, but paradigmatic love prioritizes the autonomous decisions of the beloved over one’s own ideas about how our loved ones should conduct their lives.

However, there are exceptions to this rule - such as the case of parental relationships. The argument suggests that since the autonomy of children is underdeveloped and not consistently able to advance their interests, paternalism may sometimes be compatible with love towards children. The same argument can also apply to people who are profoundly depressed - who have little to no regard for their own well-being. Regardless of these exceptions, White suggests that these cases should not be considered paradigmatic instances of love. Instead, these are unique exceptions whereby our beloved is incapable of full-rational decision making, and thus paternalistic acts can become loving when otherwise, they would not.

Contra White, I believe paternalism’s scope in love is much broader than he indicates. The first reason for this is because even when we take ourselves to be acting with full agency, we are not always an accurate judge of our own best interests. Unlike the case of children and the severely depressed, however, this is not due to a certain incapacitation. One reason for this is that our interests are often not a priority in some of our decision-making. Tim Scanlon argues that considerations of our own well-being actually play a minimal role in our deliberations and actions. (Scanlon, 1998)

Moreover, we may just make mistakes about what is in our best interest or how to go about securing our well-being (and this probably happens more than we would like to admit). All of us are fallible, and for this reason we often appreciate the second opinions of those we love. Moreover, we often blame those we love for failing to keep us accountable to our own well-being. For instance, the phrase “I can’t believe you let me do that” or “you should have stopped me” are not particularly uncommon.

In light of these observations, I want to suggest that when non-interference with the aims of our beloved would result in significant harm to them, paternalism can be morally permissible in the context of a loving relationship. I will aim to sketch the plausibility of this view with the following example:

Imagine a loving friendship between Amy and Mia, two high school best friends who have both started their undergraduate degrees at the same college. The first semester is much tougher for Amy than Mia. Amy is homesick, she is not doing particularly well in her classes, and she is not even sure if the degree program she has chosen is right for her. Mia on the other hand is succeeding in her coursework, loves her program, and is proud of her newfound independence. As things get tougher for Amy, she entertains the thought that she wants to drop out of college. Neither Mia, nor Amy’s parents, support this idea (and have tried to talk her out of it). One afternoon, Amy tells Mia “That’s it. I’m done, and I’m dropping out right now!” Knowing Amy is just having an emotional moment, Mia takes Amy’s phone and laptop and locks herself with the items in the bathroom – preventing her from logging into her student profile and dropping her classes. “Nope! I can’t let you do this!” Mia says from the bathroom. Amy, annoyed but slightly entertained, then proceeds to talk to Mia through the bathroom door until she has calmed down. Mia then opens the door, hugs Amy, and reassures her that most freshmen struggle with the transition to college, and that things will get better.

White would argue that since Mia has overridden Amy’s choices, Mia is being unloving. Contrary to White’s intuition, however, I think that Mia’s actions were exemplary of love. Why is this? Although agency is valuable, it is not the only bearer of value in love, and thus should only be considered as one factor among many that are worth paying attention to in our loved ones. Their physical, mental, and emotional well-being are other significantly important factors, as well as their future well-being. Stephen Darwall makes a similar point. He argues that what is good for a person is what is rational to want for their own sake. (Darwall, 1997) According to Darwall’s view, a person’s good is a rational object of desire for anyone who cares about that person. Therefore, the reason why paternalism can be exemplary of love is because the people who care about us the most – the people who love us – are rationally obliged to desire to bring about states of affairs that benefit us. And since our autonomous wills can be misaligned with what is good for us, those who love us are particularly well suited to recognize this and intervene accordingly.

Of course, engaging in paternalistic behavior is risky, especially if there is a reasonable chance that your judgment is incorrect. This is a reasonable worry. Therefore, if we have relatively low confidence that our beloved is making an egregious mistake that will negatively impact their good, then often it will be worth refraining from acting paternalistically. However, if our confidence is high that their actions will be a significant detriment to them, then it may be worth the risk. In employing paternalism, one must assess the benefits and harms that will accrue to their beloved if they act according to their will. Often, when the harms are minimal and easily repairable, paternalism is probably not warranted. On the other hand, if the harms that they would accrue are significantly detrimental, then paternalism can be exemplary of our love in its most responsible form.

Contributor

Ariel Gordy

Graduate Fellow