Say you politely smile at someone in the street. Your partner turns to you, confused, asking you why you’ve flirted with a stranger, doubling down even when you say you did nothing of the sort. What is it that makes these situations so disconcerting and disorienting?
Read MoreAn episode of Surprising Ethics takes on two of the papers from the CFCP Philosophy of Breakups conference.
Read MoreI consider the idea of Strawson's objective attitude as a mental perspective we can take up towards others. Within an existing relationship, adopting an objective stance requires breaking one pattern of relating and establishing another. But once established, a pattern of objectivity can become one’s new default. We may save ourselves from the immediate strains of involvement only to discover that we have exiled someone from our moral community, and no longer know how to bring her back into the fold.
Read MoreEveryone recognizes that driving drunk is blameworthy. However, it is also very commonly thought that we need to appeal to some special “tracing” conditions on blame in order to explain why it is fitting to blame drunk drivers. If we don’t have direct control over ourselves when we’re drunk, though, how could we ever be blameworthy for drunk driving?
Read MoreThis fall we have an exciting slate of CFCP Workshop visitors.
Read MoreOur Philosophy of Breakups conference was a success! Thanks to everyone who brought energy and enthusiasm to constructively discuss new issues about the end of relationships and what they teach us about other issues in philosophy.
Read MoreThe question then becomes: can digital spaces produce solidarity’s shared moral understanding in the same way in-person cooperation can?
Read MoreEven if we both feel like a plan is unfair to us individually, we owe it to the relationship to stay the course if there’s room for us to reasonably disagree over whether our joint interests are being served.
Read MoreWhen we relinquish blame for our own practical reasons, we don’t have to do so by pretending as if the wrongdoer isn’t a fit recipient of our blame.
Read MoreIn light of these observations, I want to suggest that when non-interference with the aims of our beloved would result in significant harm to them, paternalism can be morally permissible in the context of a loving relationship.
Read MoreWhether or not I can fittingly feel the reactive attitudes towards someone must depend on the kind on the relations that I bear to them. It cannot depend solely on certain features of the person we have the attitude towards (like whether or not they are morally responsible).
Read MoreThe spring CFCP workshop speakers have been announced! Join us to discuss work in progress with Hajar Yazdiha, Meena Krishnamurthy, Barrett Emerick, and Olivia Bailey.
Read MoreLiberalism offers to all citizens, each with their favorite belief system, a social contract they can endorse while remaining committed to their systems, which often constitute their social identities.
Read MoreWe can urge others to not act in some way that is contingently imprudent while at the same time making them aware of the injustice in having to not act in this way. Second, and more controversially, we should blame others, even if to a much lesser degree than perpetrators of harm, in the rare occasions when they do act imprudently and raise the chances that others harm them.
Read MoreFall slate of CFCP workshops announced! Join us to discuss work in progress by Thomas Sinclair, Rima Basu, Quinn White, and Kirun Sankaran.
Read MoreHere’s the latest in our occasional series of animated explainer videos introducing ideas or arguments from papers that have been shared in the CFCP workshop! This one explores Etienne Brown’s work on the nature and wrong of online (and offline!) trolling. Trolling may be even more pervasive than you think!
Read More
